Abstract The high-level sensitivity of medical information autonomously managed by the healthcare providers mandates stronger authentication and authorization mechanisms with authority to control access to their locally to be used in e-Health systems. This paper describes the design v and implementation of certificate-based e-Health authentication managed patient health data and information. In and authorization architecture. This architecture was developed addition, the healthcare providers are responsible for to authenticate e-Health professionals accessing shared clinical defining access-rules to protect resources and each data among a set of affiliated health institutions based on peer-topeer networks. The architecture had to accommodate specific rinsiits on setaof iconcerns. tAlo leal medical data sharing and handling requirements, namely the responsibilities and accountabilities pertinent to health security of professionals' credentials. data collection and management are the driving force behind healthcare providers guarding patient data and
I. INTRODUCTION and protect the confidential information and privacy- Without proper authentication mechanism, the managed patient data and related information, it does provision, continuity and safety of health care system not require a vast amount of ongoing maintenance, could easily be compromised. A large number of provides strong authentication and gives confidence techniques may be used to authenticate a user and a that systems are secure. Moreover, it is suitable for survey of existing tools showed that there is no single fine-grained access control and guarantees user privacy best approach for providing an authentication and and confidentiality. It also addresses user authorisation infrastructure for e-health systems [11] . A accountability, with administrators able to investigate PKI and smart card based e-Health authentication if improper use is discovered architecture to authenticate health professionals The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In accessing a regional platform for sharing clinical data Section 2, we outline the related work. The proposed among a set of affiliated health institutions on dedicated authorization framework is then presented in Section 3. national health network known as Rede Telematica da The conclusion and future work is discussed in Section Sau(de (RTS) is described in [9] .
4.
An authorisation and authentication architecture for ehealth services system that integrates the role-based II. RELATED WORK method [7] and the attribute certificate (or privilege) In this paper, we refer to e-health system as healthcare based method [3] into the electronic health service systems and services that are interconnected and can system is discussed in [8] . A fingerprint-based model work together easily and effectively, while maintaining suitable for medical images privacy protection against patient and professional confidentiality, privacy, and unauthorised release of images by an authorised security. We assume a multidisciplinary team recipient is discussed in [10] . environment where patients will be treated by a Existing approaches are based on technical solutions potentially large team of health providers geographically that are well known in distributed system with a single distributed in various locations.
centralized node controlling the authentication process. Each healthcare provider operates autonomously The common denominators of these previous approaches within distinct domain and has different healthcare are generally strongly biased toward a single individual information systems to support local patient care. The interacting with a single application. Moreover, those healthcare providers and their systems deal with a whole based on digital certificate and public key infrastructures range of sensitive issues related to patient information to build and operate authentication or authorisation such as diagnostic reports, MRI images, pathological test infrastructure is only adopted the identity certificate. An results, diagnosis reports, prescriptions, and so on. In the identity certificate is an electronic document certificate rest of the paper, we define healthcare professionals that provides generally recognized proof of identity just (HP) as any person involved in any kind of health care like a passport, or other personal IDs. Identity related services that include doctors, nurses, certificates are issued by certificate authorities (CAs) in administrative staff, support staff and IT staff. much the same way as government agencies issue Since health professionals have to provide a wide passports after verifying an individual's identity. CAs range of distinctive services, the roles of various types of can be either independent third parties or organizations HPs differ widely, which requires differentiated access running their own certificate-issuing server software. roles to the users of the e-health system. Also, The certificate authority generally uses published individuals have the right to expect that their identifiable verification procedures to ensure that an entity health information will not be disclosed without their requesting a certificate is in fact who it claims to be. express informed consent. Moreover, accessing patient
In our previous work, we proposed an e-health related data must be on-demanding and on need bases. In infrastructure (E-HP2) [5] that provides integrated addition, as the custodian of patient information, each services to health care workers that are more broadly healthcare provider is responsible for protecting patient accessible by leveraging P2P technology and electronic information in patient database against un-authorised health records. In E-HP2, a number of healthcare use.
organisations (e.g., doctors, pathology labs, pharmacies In general, securing distributed systems continues to and hospitals) willingly collaborate by virtually be an important research challenge. Authentication in integrating their information systems. E-HP2 enables such networked e-health system is important and health providers to share patient information in a challenging.
seamless, fault-tolerant and scalable manner. It is important to note that the provision of infrastructure Fig. 1 shows the proposed overall operational services is an enabling mechanism. The infrastructure architecture.
We assume that each healthcare itself will deliver some benefits, but the main outcomes professional (HP) is assigned a set of specific rights will be achieved by the provision of additional (roles) that governs the permissions needed to applications and services. accomplish his/her tasks. We propose the use of remote Although there is a merit for easy accessibility of and local user roles with each requiring different individual's health information by qualified and authentication mechanisms. First, the healthcare authorized individuals using P2P network, this could professionals (HP) must be authenticated to the local evastly increase the potential for abuse of that patient data health system. At the second level, there should be a and related information. This work extends our previous remote access authentication system. These are achieved work by adding an authentication protocol to make the through two distinct phases. sharing of patient data and related information in a Initially, every user obtains an identity certificate. We seamless and secure way. However, authentication assume that each autonomous domain has its own protocol is more difficult to achieve in a pure P2P Identity Certificate Authority (ICA). We also assume network architecture than in a centralized environment. that the ICAs in the P2P trust each other. The ICAs are This is because no central server is used to verify a responsible for the creation, digitally signing and peer's identity.
distribution of the identity certificates to users registered The proposed protocol is based on a Public-Key in that domain. In a multi-team environment, the issue of Infrastructure (PKI) that supports the issuing and managing patient consent to the use and disclosure of management of digital certificates which identify and personal information is paramount. In this paper, we authenticate authorized users. When a certificate assume that when a patient visits a hospital, the patient authority issues an identity certificate, it binds a provides his/her consent on the use of her medical data particular public key to the name of the entity identified and digitally signs the consent form and the consent in the certificate (such as the name of a doctor). The In CdENtriALbASedan AuTHENtidiscATiOn PtOCOLehealt Therefore, the second phase consists of obtaining the In distributed and multidisciplinary team e-health consent and attribute certificates. The consent certificate systems with multilevel administrative domains, will impose use-conditions on the patient data. All of the authentication of the UPs is a must. In this section, we use-conditions must be met simultaneously in order to discuss the proposed authentication architecture and satisfy the requirements for patient data access. An protocol.
attribute certificate certifies that the user possesses a A. Authentication Architecture value for a given attribute. An attribute describes a The interaction of health providers with the system property associated with an individual such as has to be secured through a complex process Of information that describes the qualifications and authentication and authorization, authorities granted to the target entity. Each attribute certificate may use only the information that is of HP roles from a set of initially assigned roles, which absolutely necessary to obtain the needed services. are needed to accomplish specific tasks. Attribute certificate validity period must be within the The HP will then send to the remote gateway (RGW) a validity period of the identity certificate. A HP may request for data (R) along with the attribute certificate possess different attribute certificates related to different (AC) and consent certificate (CC). When the RGW validity intervals or even different purposes. It must be receives the access request from the health professionals, noted that, generally speaking, attributes are subject to it sends the attribute certificate and the consent change according to each situation. For example, the certificate to the local attribute certificate authorities rights of HPs usually consist of both static and very (ACA) and consent certificate authorities (CCA) for dynamic permissions. As a result, the content of attribute verification respectively. These certificate authorities certificates varies from case to case. Basically, static generally use published verification procedures to ensure permissions are issued by health authorities, dynamic that an entity requesting the data is in fact who it claims permissions may be issued even by hospitals and clinics. to be. Attribute verification is the process of establishing Static qualification and authorization attributes can also an understood level of confidence that an attribute be connected with dynamic permissions and admission, applies to a specific individual. The result of the for example by a supervisor or administrator within the verification step is used by the authorization step which IT environment of a hospital.
is outside the scope of this paper. The system uses the attribute certificate authority (ACA) and the individual consent certificate authority Fig. 2 shows the steps performed in the proposed constraints imposed on the healthcare data usage. The authentication mechanism. Specifically, when HP proposed protocol offers a number of advantages initiates a new session for remote data request; he/she including a user-friendly and strong authentication and must first identify and authenticate themselves, with the gives confidence that systems are secure. We plan to local gateway (LGW) server, by using their IC and extend the proposed approach such that it is able to password. The validated IC of the user is then used by delegate and recognize delegated credentials. We also the GW to gathers up all the relevant certificates, plan to extend it such that a single-sign on capability is depending on the responsibility/authority of the HP roles realized. activated by the request. The GW also ensures that the HP has the need for the information sought. This step produces a short-lived attribute certificate with a subset
